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A B S T R A C T
We analyse the profession of criminal defence lawyers (“advocates”) in Russia to under-
stand their potential for collective action in an imperfect institutional environment. In 2013,
we conducted a survey of 372 advocates in 9 regions of Russia. The following two main
hypotheses are tested: (1) lawyers with strong ethical values have a higher demand for col-
lective action; and (2) the negative experience of clients’ rights violations by law enforcement
oﬃcers can motivate advocates to support the foundation of a strong professional associ-
ation. We suggest that an advocate’s profession with bona ﬁde members at the core could
be an instrument to evaluate and to improve the quality of law enforcement in Russia.
Copyright Copyright © 2017, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production
and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
After perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union,
two opposing processes could be observed in Russia. On the
one hand, the market transition implied the development
of legal regulation and the formation of legal institutions
to accompany growing demand for legal services. On signal
of this demand was manifested in the dramatic increase in
the number of law students. On the other hand, because of
the weak state and the general degradation of the law en-
forcement system, which was unprepared to address the
new realities, most economic entities either ignored legal
requirements – engaging in large-scale tax evasion, barter
and non-payments, etc. – or tried tomanipulate legal norms,
such as the legislation concerning bankruptcy and joint-
stock companies, in unintended ways. The consequence of
these two processes was an increase in the size of the pro-
fession of advocates (licensed private criminal defence
lawyers) and a simultaneous obvious decline in profession-
al standards. After Vladimir Putin came to power in the
2000s, the restoration of the state led to the strengthen-
ing of the law enforcement system and increased risk for
those engaging in legal noncompliance. However, the com-
bination of non-homogeneous staff and a distorted pattern
of incentives stemming from the closed nature of the law
enforcement system and a lack of public control over it re-
sulted in a systematic tendency towards accusatory bias in
court decisions (the probability of not-guilty verdict is less
than 1%), violent pressure on businesses, corruption, large-
scale violations of human rights, and a lack of progress in
the ﬁght against crime.
Attempts to reform the existing system through on-
going general legal reform, reforms of the Interior Ministry,
the separation of the Investigation Committee and the Pros-
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ecution Oﬃce, etc. have thus far produced no tangible
results. The key problems linking law enforcement and ju-
dicial system reforms are their objective evaluation in an
absence of independent courts and genuine political com-
petition, as well as the extremely limited inﬂuence of free
mass media. Public opinion polls concerning the perfor-
mance of law enforcement do not provide a reliable picture
of the situation, because the majority of the population is
rarely involved with the courts and the prosecution au-
thorities. Any real encounters often have dramatic
implications, however. In the absence of reliable informa-
tion this situation entails, advocates can step in to ﬁll the
information gap: providing both the state and society with
an external evaluation of the quality of law enforcement and
an examination of potential reforms. In this study we try
to answer two key questions: what factors increase the
demand of advocates for collective action in the context of
an imperfect institutional environment and what groups of
advocates can become the drivers for social changes in
Russia?
In this study we try to show that a corporation of ad-
vocates could be subjected to changes in the legal profession
under current conditions. Advocate (“advokat”) is a formal
status that allowsRussian lawyers towork on criminal cases.
Since 2002 lawyers must have higher legal education and
at least two years of legal practice to take the special exam
tobecomeanadvocate. Every advocate inRussia is amember
of a regional chamber of advocates andmust pay an annual
fee and conform to a formal code of legal ethics. Because of
this, advocates are themost organised part of the legal com-
munity in contemporary Russia. This professional group has
clear membership and strict rules of professional control
that private lawyers (so called “chastnopraktikuyushchie
yuristy”, attorneys who did not pass the bar exam) lack.
Therefore, in our study we will focus on advocates as the
most organised part of the legal profession in Russia. Ad-
vocates as a special professional group are by law part of
civil society. Although they regularly interact with various
representatives of law enforcement bodies they are for-
mally independent from them. Thequestion is towhat extent
this professional group is ready to become a platform for
creating an external evaluation of the law enforcement
system and its practices. We argue that now there are no
other professional or social groups in Russia with the rel-
evant skills and knowledge of the law enforcement system
and organisational capacity for to provide systemic infor-
mation. An important advantage of advocates compared to
other sources is that their evaluations of the quality of law
enforcement have a higher probability of being politically
neutral. Therefore under the current political regime, they
can be accepted by ruling elites in ways that assessments
by human rights activists or the political opposition cannot
and can help to improve the law enforcement system.
However this important task can only be realised by a large,
inclusive professional corporation of advocates.
In our survey of 372 advocates conducted from Novem-
ber to December 2013 in nine regions of Russia, we proposed
a mechanism for a type of “external evaluation”. The pos-
sibility to create such external evaluation is not yet widely
understood by the majority in the profession, but the idea
receives support from advocates with whom we have dis-
cussed it. The survey also allows us to assess the main
incentives for collective action in the community of lawyers,
because this mechanism can only be launched in a profes-
sional group through the efforts of its members.
To evaluate the potential incentives of advocates for col-
lective action, we formed and tested several hypotheses. First,
Hypothesis 1. The demand for collective action (exercised
through professional associations) will primarily be ex-
pressed by advocates with high ethical standards.
By ethical standards, we mean an orientation of advo-
cates on the interests of their clients and the reputation of
the legal profession, rather than a focus on personal beneﬁt
or the interests of state. Generally, this means that advo-
cates will follow the formal rules in Russia’s Code of Ethics.
We note that the risk of a decline in the reputation of the
profession is quite tangible to advocates, as it may mani-
fest in an overall drop in prices for legal services because
of a lack of quality signals (cf. Akerlof, 1970 for a similar
situation in “lemon” car markets).
Hypothesis 2. A personal encounter in which the rights of de-
fendants are violated by law enforcement will create an
incentive for advocates’ collective action.
This circumstance may be indirectly registered through
advocate assessments of existing law enforcement prac-
tices and the reasons for the “accusatory bias” in legal
decisions.
By suggesting these hypotheses, we try to determine both
the internal motivation (professional ethics) and external
stimuli (violations of the rights of defendants) for collec-
tive action among advocates. Thus we can take into account
the most important factors of collective action discussed in
the literature within our study.
This paper is divided into 8 sections. In Section 2 we
discuss several theoretical approaches to research on the
profession of advocates and the factors that can stimulate
collective action among professionals. In Section 3 we
provide a short history of Russian advocacy and describe
the characteristics of this corporation inmodern Russia. After
the description of sample and methodology (Section 4) we
present a brief portrait of an advocate in Russia (Section 5)
and then discuss both internal and external incentives for
collective action (Section 6). Finally, we test our hypoth-
eses using the regression analysis (Section 7) and then
conclude.
2. Theoretical approaches to the research of the
profession of attorneys
Research on the legal profession traditionally proceeds
in the framework of professionalism (Evetts, 2003). Pro-
fessionalism emphasises the privileged status of lawyers
equipped with special formal knowledge, ethical stan-
dards, and a developed professional community (Brante,
1988). Some researchers note that professional groups follow
a “third logic” (Freidson, 2001) distinctive from the logic of
the market and the logic of bureaucracy. Interestingly, busi-
ness associations occupy a similar marginal place between
the state and the market (Schneider, 2004); their mission
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is to seek a balance between the tasks of the authorities and
the interests of entrepreneurs. Professional groups, such as
attorneys and physicians, also create this type of associa-
tion to protect their interests (Parsons, 1939; Halliday, 1987),
but professionalism does not necessarily imply collective
action.
Researchers distinguish two different types of mobili-
sation related to the legal profession: “legal mobilisation”
and the “mobilisation of lawyers” (Marshall & Hale, 2014).
In “legal mobilisation”, lawyers act as intermediaries
between the government and certain groups of citizens. In
particular, studies on legal mobilisation as a strategy used
by various marginalised groups, such as immigrants (Kawar,
2011), leprosy patients (Arrington, 2014), prisoners (Prabhat,
2011; Ratner, 2007), etc., have recently gained popularity.
Researchers have concluded that this type of mobilisation
is the result of growth in the accessibility and transparen-
cy of justice (Arrington, 2014; Lawrence, 1991). In “legal
mobilisation”, lawyers are often considered “gatekeepers”
(Marshall & Hale, 2014; Silbey, 2005) of change to social in-
stitutions. The legal profession in this framework is viewed
as having unique skills that provide the necessary tools for
social change (Teles, 2010).
The second type of collective action, “mobilisation of
lawyers”, comprises mobilisation of lawyers that is intend-
ed to improve the legal profession and protect their
professional status. A good example of this type of collec-
tive action occurred in Pakistan since Pervez Musharraf’s
rise to power (Ghias, 2010), where particularly in 2007,
lawyers opposed the politicallymotivated dismissal of judges
(Faqir, Islam, & Rizvi, 2013).
In both types of mobilisation, lawyers with different sta-
tuses, competencies, expertise, and professional backgrounds
can be involved in collective action (Prabhat, 2011). In this
context, however, it is important to understand the motives
for these activities.
In the literature regarding lawyers’ collective action, we
distinguish two main theoretical frames that explain the
motives of lawyers for mobilisation: “cause lawyering”, de-
veloped by Sarat and Scheingold (1998), and “political
lawyering”, suggested by Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley (2007).
The “cause lawyering” approach suggests that lawyers are
ﬁrst and foremost the defenders of ordinary people. Their
main function is to protect the “weak side” in a dispute, with
the state typically considered to be the strong side. There-
fore, cause lawyering is often associated with human rights
protection (Hajjar, 1997;Moley, 2014; Ratner, 2007) and “pro
bono” work (Granﬁeld, 2007; Sandefur, 2007). Political law-
yering is instead focused on the relations between the legal
profession and the state. Lawyers trying to change the system
in order to get some privileges is one example. Political law-
yering hasmany similarities with professional lobbying (Paik,
Heinz, & Southworth, 2011), which is usually well organised
and based on a high level of economic and social capital.
In this regard, a discussion of political lawyering is similar
to the literature concerning the concept of “professional proj-
ects” and attempts by professionals to “monopolise” the
market (Evetts, 2003; Freidson, 1984; Gobe, 2013).
From the body of the literature about cause lawyering
and political lawyering we can conclude that lawyers can
act both on the side of the ordinary people and on the side
of the government. But what determines the choice of which
to pursue?
For cause lawyering, such as pro bono work or human
rights protection, the internal motives of lawyers are very
important (Boukalas, 2013), because economic goals cannot
explain provision of legal services free of charge. There-
fore, this approach is more closely associated with the vast
literature devoted to legal ethics (Abbott, 1983; Beggs &
Dean, 2007; Overman & Foss, 1991) and principle agent
problems between lawyers and their clients (Kritzer, 1998;
Marshall & Hale, 2014; Moorhead, Paterson, & Sherr, 2003;
Pepper, 1986; Sarat & Felstiner, 1988). Sociologists usually
consider the nature of attorneys’ work in terms of a “con-
tract” between society and professionals; according to this
contract, society provides high status and privileges, while
professionals obey professional ethics (Evetts, 2003, 400).
This tacit contract is necessary because neither society nor
professional groups are capable of completely controlling
the quality of the professionals’ work. This partial control
is also why professional ethics and oversight are key to any
profession, including advocates (see Abbott, 1983).
Conversely external causes play a decisive role for “po-
litical lawyering”. According to this approach, the weak
institutional position of Russian advocacy – manifested in
frequent violations of defendant rights by law enforce-
ment – can be as serious a motive for collective action as
ethical values. Recently, research regarding lawyers’ col-
lective action has focused primarily on the United States and
countries that share the Anglo-American legal tradition
(Kawar, 2011). The experiences of these countries cannot
always be used in the analyses of post-communist coun-
tries with continental legal systems, however. In Russia,
judges and other representatives of the law enforcement
system often feel that they are part of the state rather than
independent agents (Solomon, 2005).
A “logic of professionals” (in terms of Freidson) is char-
acteristic of different representatives of the legal profession
to different degrees. The prosecution and the courts in Russia
are particularly exposed to bureaucratic logic and inﬂu-
enced by it. (Volkov, 2012) provides numerous examples
of hierarchical practices in court decisions. The heavy-
handed system of reporting that persists among law
enforcement oﬃcers and judges (Paneyakh, 2014) is another
manifestation of the fact that the formal level of profes-
sional control in these groups prevails over informal peer
control or self-control through the adherence to ethical stan-
dards. Formal regulations in these segments overrule all
other considerations, and therefore bureaucratic logic is
thriving.
The profession of advocates is relevant in this context
because it lies exactly between the logic of the market and
the logic of bureaucracy. On the one hand, attorneys are not
appointed by higher-ranking oﬃcials, and, on the other hand,
their work prohibits the possibility of selling their exper-
tise as services (Bear, 1951, 976).
The special status of attorneys in society and the law en-
forcement system makes their opinions crucial for
understanding the problems and development prospects of
the entire legal profession. There is an opinion that advo-
cates in Russia have traditionally been on the fringes in a
type of isolation (Solomon, 2005), whereas prosecutors and
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judges occupied a central position. The accusatory tenden-
cy in the administration of justice makes full acquittal of
clients practically impossible – the proportion of acquit-
tals in Russian courts has not exceeded 1% for over 20 years
(Volkov, 2012). Interestingly, however, a similar situation
is observed throughout the entire post-Soviet region in
Latvia, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, and Bulgaria (Volkov, 2012).
These problems could and should be addressed by a
strong professional association that includes the majority
of members of the profession of attorneys (Bonelli, 2003)
and is capable of eﬃciently lobbying their collective inter-
ests at the level of the state, similar to the American Bar
Association (see Kawar, 2011). Russian advocates can be
members of different lawyer associations (like Associa-
tion of Lawyers of Russia), but it appears that thus far, these
associations have not been fulﬁlling these functions.
In this context, the approaches used by many research-
ers for analysing the formation of business associations in
developing countries are useful to study the development
of the legal profession in Russia (cf. Pyle, 2006). Speciﬁcal-
ly, using a case of Brazil and Southern Italy, Locke (2001)
shows that business associations can ensure community co-
ordination, contribute to the strengthening of trust among
key actors, and help establish a dialogue with the state even
if the market and state institutions are weak. With this end
in view, business associations, according to Locke (2001, 12),
should undergo the following three steps: the creation of
demand in the community, support from the stat, and an
increase in the association’s authority and independence in
response to the support received. Professional associa-
tions of lawyers in Russia are currently close to the second
phase of this process. The development of a truly author-
itative professional association is possible onlywith collective
action intended to strengthen trust towards the profession-
al community, however.
3. Advocates in the Soviet Union and Russia
The professional association of advocates in Russia has
a long history. The status of advocates at law, who per-
formed the functions of defence counsel in court trials, was
introduced as part of the judicial reform in 1864. After the
October revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks decided that the
new communist society had no place for the legal profes-
sion. Therefore, a 1917 decree of the Council of People’s
Commissars “on the Court” abolished the institution of the
bar in Russia. However, in 1922, the “Provision on the Bar
Council” returned the defence advocates to the judicial
process. Moreover, advocates were granted the right to create
professional associations.
In the Soviet Union, advocates could provide their ser-
vices only to private individuals, which explained their
specialisation primarily in criminal and family law. Advo-
cates were largely independent of the party bureaucracy
system, which gave them the unique status of a “free pro-
fession” (Mrowczynski, 2012). Autonomy is crucial to
professionalism because professionals can obtain high social
status and eﬃciently pursue their interests (Larson, 1977).
Advocates in the Soviet Union enjoyed this high status. In
addition, advocates had opportunities for informal income
(Mrowczynski, 2012, 106), which strengthened their posi-
tion in Soviet society evenmore. According to the “Provision
on the Bar” adopted in 1939, advocates had a right to es-
tablish associations organised in regions. Consistent with
the Provision, a person with a higher legal education, a grad-
uate of a law school, or a personwith three years’ experience
working at a court or the prosecutor’s oﬃce was eligible to
practise law as an advocate. These requirements are very
important in the framework of professionalism and for the
formation of a strong profession enjoying a privileged status.
During the pre-war period, the requirement of obligatory
higher legal education was not established even for judges,
however. In 1946, 14.6% of judges in the Soviet Union had
higher legal education (Volkov, 2012), and the proportion
of advocates with a university degree in 1947 was 41.7%
(Razi, 1960), which indicates the signiﬁcant professional su-
periority of advocates. Therefore, advocates were the elite
among the legal community until the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
With the beginning of perestroika, bar associations
began losing their positions because entry barriers to the
profession radically declined. This decline had several com-
plementarycauses.On theonehand,developmentof amarket
economy and the introduction of market-oriented regula-
tion led to strong demand for lawyers from the business
community. Universities started to respond on this demand
with multifold increase in the number of law students. On
the other hand, in Soviet times all quality requirements for
new advocates were based mostly on informal agreements
betweenmembers of the bar. Even higher educationwas not
formally required for the provision of legal services. There-
fore,many newplayerswithout relevant experience tried to
gain from this lack of formal regulation of profession in the
post-Soviet period. Almost all universities introduced pro-
grammes of legal education – very often without a full staff
of teachers of the law. Former employees of law enforce-
ment agencies (sometimes even those ﬁred formisconduct)
started to create new organisations of advocates in parallel
with theold Soviet collegiums. The lackof regulation, absence
of strong professional associations, and requirements for a
bar examall led to the dilution of professional standards and
the decline in the average quality of legal services after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
Russian advocates did not become formally organised
into a single association until 2002, contrasting with other
formerly Communist countries like Poland, where attor-
neys were organisedmuch earlier (Mrowczynski, 2012). The
Soviet Lawyers’ Union was created in 1989 but only lasted
until 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union was followed
by a considerable dilution of the profession of advocates,
because it was joined by many lawyers from prosecutors’
oﬃces, courts, and other government agencies. The rapid
growth of the legal profession began in the ﬁnal Soviet years;
in 1965, universities were annually preparing only 6900
graduates in law, whereas in 1980, 40 legal departments and
4 legal universities prepared 16,700 graduates (Feldbrugge,
Van den Berg, & Simons, 1985, 473). During these 15 years,
the total size of the legal community in the Soviet Union
doubled (from 100,000 to 200,000 lawyers with higher
education).
In 1970, the Soviet Union had 15,000 advocates (i.e., one
advocate for almost 16,000 residents) and 40,000 legal ad-
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visers. In 1980, 20,000 advocates were practising law in the
Soviet Union (13,000 residents per advocate) in addition to
70,000 legal advisers (Feldbrugge et al., 1985, 473). The
growth of the number of advocates in the 1970s and 1980s
proceeded at a much slower pace than the growth in other
segments of the legal profession, which indicates the rel-
atively closed nature of the professional group of advocates
in these years.
According to different estimates, the ratio of advocates
in the Russian Federation in the 1990s (considering the pop-
ulation decrease compared with the Soviet period) grew 4-
to 5-fold (Mrowczynski, 2012). An important change in
lawyers’ activity after the collapse of the Soviet Union was
the opportunity to work in the commercial sphere. An in-
crease in the number of private companies created a need
for qualiﬁed lawyers who actually did not have to be ad-
vocates. The emergence of the market has become a driving
force for increasing ﬁnancial incentives to join the profes-
sion, which produced an even more rapid growth in the
number of lawyers and legal departments at universities.
According to the Association of Lawyers of Russia,
166,000 students were annually receiving legal education
in Russia as of 2009, which is 10 times more than in the
Soviet Union in the 1980s. Although many graduates do not
work in legal ﬁelds, this excess of new specialists resulted
in a devaluation of diplomas and a gradual dilution of the
boundaries of the legal profession. This dilution of the
boundaries had several consequences. First, many gradu-
ates started to work as lawyers without becoming advocates.
They provided the same services for all types of clients –
both citizens and businesses – as advocates, except for
working on criminal proceedings. Second, no bar exam
existed in Russia since the collapse of Soviet Union and
before 2002. Therefore, many people with poor qualiﬁca-
tions and a lack of experience were able to acquire the status
of advocate during this period.
The reform of the legal practice market by the adop-
tion of the Federal Law “On Legal Practice and Advocacy in
the Russian Federation”, which went into force on 31 May
2002, led to the formation in 2003 of the Federal Chamber
of Attorneys (FCA). Membership in this association became
compulsory for all advocates in its regional branches. In ad-
dition, the merger of the Russian Law Society and the Law
Society of Russia in 2005 resulted in the creation of the As-
sociation of Lawyers of Russia (ALR) – one of the biggest
associations with voluntary membership in Russia. ALR
unites not only advocates but also private and corporate
lawyers, law enforcement oﬃcials, judges and even some
state oﬃcials with legal education.
Despite the membership of many high-ranking oﬃ-
cials in the ALR (including Russian President Vladimir Putin
and Premier DmitryMedvedev), as of 28 October 2013 there
were only 2030 advocates among its members. This was
about 3% of the total number of advocates in Russia. At the
same time, there was 2.5% annual growth in the number
of advocates registered in Russia in the past ﬁve years and
growth in the number of lawyers who are members of the
ALR, although this does not account for the number of ad-
vocates (Figs. 1 and 2).
Although the absolute number of advocates in Russia is
growing, the proportion of the number of advocates to the
size of the population is slightly below the ﬁgures for other
European countries. A comparative evaluation of the number
of advocates is complicated by the fact that not all coun-
tries make a distinction between advocates and lawyers, and
not all countries have data on the number of attorneys in
the legal profession. Considering there are approximately
300,000 private lawyers in Russia (no one knows the exact
number because private lawyers are not registered), there
are 390 residents per lawyer in Russia. This exceeds the
ﬁgures for Germany, Ukraine and Poland but is lower than
the level of the United States and Italy (Table 1).
Many legal services in Russia are being provided by
persons who have not taken a bar exam. This fact indi-
cates there is a lack of control over the quality of professional
training and legal ethics of most market participants, who
are not members of either lawyers’ chambers or profes-
sional associations. This situation was negatively assessed
by advocates who agreed to give us an interview, and they
also expressed full support (91%) of the “monopoly of ad-
vocates”, an idea that only advocates should have access to
court proceedings is all cases.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of ad-
vocates in Russia radically increased (Mrowczynski, 2012),
whereas there was no bar exam at that time. The lack of a
bar exam could eventually lead to a decline in the quality
of work of advocates and the dilution of professional values.
This situation is why it was important for us to register the
differences in the views of advocates representing differ-
ent generations as part of our study (see Table 8).
Fig. 1. Dynamics of the number of advocates in Russia (according to data
from the Federal Chamber of Advocates).
Fig. 2. Dynamics of the number of members of the Association of Lawyers
of Russia.
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4. Sample frame formation and survey characteristics
Research on the legal profession encounters the problem
of opposition to normativism (Halliday, 1985). Lawyers often
have a ready answer to many questions referring to regu-
lations. This is whywe held six in-depth, informal interviews
with advocates and many meetings with representatives of
the legal profession to determine whether our questions
were properly formulated and do not allow dual
interpretations.
The ﬁnal version of the questionnaire generally re-
ﬂects the aspects of the research on the legal profession
described above. In the context of questions regarding dif-
ferent levels of professional control, we paid considerable
attention to the problem of ethics and the professional paths
of advocates. We tried to explain the isolation of the ad-
vocates and the role of this isolation in the conditions of
the existing accusatory judicial tendency. We asked ques-
tions concerning interactions with representatives of the law
enforcement and judicial systems and the reasons behind
the relatively small number of acquittals.
Finally, we devoted one block of questions to the for-
mation of the profession and the role of legal associations
in the activities of advocates.
The study, conducted by the Institute for Industrial and
Market Studies (IIMS) at the National Research University
– Higher School of Economics (HSE), involved a survey of
372 advocates from nine Russian regions representing all
of Russia’s federal districts. The survey was conducted on
the basis of the formalised questionnaire discussed above.
The response rate was about 20–25% for all regions, which
is relatively large for a subject group such as professional
advocates (taking into account their busy schedules). The
list of regions and the number of respondents in each of
them are presented in Table 1. The survey was conducted
through regional branches of the ALR. Because one of the
purposes of the survey was to establish the differences
between ALR members and non-members, minimal quotas
of respondents in each group were established for each
region, which provided an opportunity to conduct a com-
parative analysis. As a result, as shown in Table 3, the
proportion of advocates who are ALR members in our
sample considerably exceeds the proportion of ALRmembers
in the overall population of advocates in the relevant regions
(40% compared with 3%) (Tables 2 and 3).
In the next section we provide a portrait of a typical
Russian advocate in order to show some basic informa-
tion about the profession before discussing possible
incentives for collective action.
5. A brief portrait of an advocate
According to the data presented in Table 4, the average
age of our respondents is 40, and their average profession-
al experience is 9 years. Approximately 42% of the advocates
sampled received their legal education before the 2000s (46%
of ALR members), and approximately 30% of respondents
took a distance course in jurisprudence. Approximately 28%
of respondents became advocates immediately after grad-
uation, and 20% joined the bar after working at commercial
companies. Approximately 19% of advocates who were ALR
members were previously employed in the law enforce-
ment and judicial systems, compared to 27.6% of ALR non-
members. Generally, in the opinion of most advocates (57%
of ALR members and 73% of ALR non-members), new ad-
vocates often join the profession having experience at law
enforcement agencies (Table 4).
Approximately 25% of ALRmembers and 33% of ALR non-
members received degrees from correspondence
programmes. The proportion of respondents with dis-
tance education is considerably higher among those who
were admitted to the bar from law enforcement agencies
and the judiciary system (35% and 45%, respectively),
however.We also asked our respondents whether they share
the opinion that some advocates act as intermediaries
between their clients and law enforcement, helping them
achieve a certain outcome in their cases. In all, 22% of re-
spondents consider this a widespread practice, and 60% said
this occasionally occurs.
Table 1
Number of lawyers in different countries around the world.
Country Number of
attorneys
(thousand)
Residents
per attorney
USA 1260 248
Italy 234 260
Germany 158 516
Romania 24 885
Ukraine 50 911
India 1300 951
France 54 1221
Latvia 1.35 1500
Turkey 46 1658
Russia 68 (368*) 2100 (390*)
Poland 10.4 (40,5**) 3700 (950**)
Belarus 2 4730
Notes: Number of attorneys according to the information of the Council
of Bars and Law Societies of Europe for 2012, for Russia – according to the
information of the Federal Chamber of Advocates for 2013. *Number in-
cluding private lawyers. **Number including legal advisers (for more details
on their activity, see Mrowczynski, 2012).
Table 2
Total number of respondent advocates and advocates registered in the
regions of the survey.
Total
respondents
Including
ALR
members
Advocates
in the
region
Advocates
in ALR
Volgograd Region 41 19 1,277 21
Vologda Region 35 14 3,92 25
Far Eastern
Federal
District
28 16 1,301 37
Krasnoyarsk
Territory
40 22 2,759 121
Moscow 39 15 8,346 174
Moscow Region 42 16 5,130 91
Penza Region 66 16 456 40
Sverdlovsk Region 41 24 1,949 63
Stavropol Territory 40 9 1,510 120
Total 372 151 23,120 692
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6. Incentives for collective action: ethical principles
and facing injustice
Conducting a survey of the profession of attorneys, we
expected to measure the dynamics of ethical values, their
dependence on the biographical and professional charac-
teristics of advocates, and how this relates to preferences
for a strong professional association.
Our ﬁndings show that advocates with a higher level of
ethical standards are more enthusiastic about the need for
a strong professional association (see Table 5).
For an advocate oriented towards personal beneﬁt, a
strong professional association could become an obstacle.
A strong professional association may produce additional
signals concerning the quality of services by developing pro-
fessional standards, creating blacklists of unscrupulous
entities and inadequate universities, controlling adher-
ence to ethical standards, etc.
Surveys in Europe and the USA emphasise the follow-
ing types of lawyers: those concerned with the public
beneﬁt, those oriented towards corporate values, and those
concentrating on personal beneﬁt (Mindes & Acock, 1982;
Overman & Foss, 1991; Tapp & Levine, 1974). These moti-
vations can be characteristic of both law enforcement oﬃcers
and attorneys. The crucial issue is the interrelation of these
ethical views inside each professional group.
Table 3
Form of legal practice.
Respondents % of the
sample
% according to data
of the Federal
Chamber of AdvocatesTotal (n) % of ALR
members
% of ALR
non-members
Bar association 278 71 78.6 74.7 66
Law oﬃce 21 11.3 2 5.6 4.8
Legal advice 57 12.6 17 15.3 28.1
Legal counselling oﬃce 11 4.6 1.5 3 0.3
Table 4
Main descriptive statistics.
ALR
member
ALR
non-member
Total
Proportion of males (%) 60 54 56.5
Average age (years) 40 39 40
Married (%) 67 63 65
Average experience of advocate’s work (years) 10 8 9
Proportion who received legal education before the 2000s (%) 46 37 42
Form of education (%)
Full-time 67 61 64
Evening course 8 6 7
Distance course 25 33 29
Specialisation by types of clients
Population (over 60%) 46% 74% 62%
Business (over 60%) 26% 12% 18%
Mixed 28% 15% 20%
Table 5
Relationship between ethical values and the position concerning the need for a strong professional association.
Advocates need a strong professional association…
Thesis Position For screening
draft laws
For enhancing control
over the quality
of legal education
For control of
compliance with
professional ethics
by lawyers
“If my peer regularly violates professional ethics norms, I would prefer
not to work with him”
Disagree 33% 36% 28%
Agree 53% 53% 52%
“The opinion of a lawyer’s peers about his professional competence is
very important to him”
Disagree 38% 38% 38%
Agree 56% 57% 55%
“A private attorney should ﬁrst and foremost think about his personal
income, and only afterwards about the client’s beneﬁt”
Disagree 53% 54% 51%
Agree 29% 27% 37%
“A lawyer should treat all clients equally, regardless of their ﬁnancial
status, social standing, education, etc.”
Disagree 45% 43% 43%
Agree 51% 52% 50%
“Lawyers make money out of ‘loopholes’ in the legislation” Disagree 42% 46% 46%
Agree 62% 56% 54%
Notes: Pearson Chi Square is signiﬁcant at 0,00. Bold denotes differences that are signiﬁcant at 0,05 level (adjusted standardised residuals >1,96 or <−1,96).
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The non-homogeneity of profession of advocates is sub-
stantiated by our ﬁndings. Our cluster analysis enables the
classiﬁcation of advocates into three groups based on several
factors conventionally identiﬁed in the literature (see
Table 6): “reputation-oriented,” “holders of a cynical view
of the profession,” and “beneﬁt-oriented.” The “beneﬁt ori-
ented” category is the least complete, whichmeets our initial
assumptions that advocates oriented towards personal
beneﬁt should agree to take our survey less frequently.
The remaining part of the sample of advocates is divided
into two approximately equal groups depending on the
“image of the profession” formed by the individual advo-
cate (see a detailed description of the groups in Table 7).
A large part of the legal community is certain that the pop-
ulation does not trust lawyers (70%) and that the verdict in
a criminal case is more important than the truth (50%). They
also believe than an honest lawyer cannot make a career
in public law (47%). Only 13% of advocates in this group
Table 6
Factor analysis (based on questions about professional ethics).
Statement about values “Negative
image of the
profession”
“Maximising
beneﬁt”
“Profession
level of
control”
“An honest lawyer cannot make a career in public law bodies” 0.648
“Lawyers make money out of ‘loopholes’ in the legislation” 0.582
“The verdict rather than the establishment of the truth is important in a criminal case” 0.561
“Russians who have no legal education often mistrust lawyers” 0.395
“If my peer regularly violates professional ethics norms I would prefer not to work with him” −0.743
“I am prepared to give up my profession if I ﬁnd a job with a higher level of salary but not in the same
specialty”
0.615
“A private attorney should ﬁrst and foremost think about his personal income, and only afterwards
about the client’s beneﬁt”
0.466
“The profession of a lawyer in Russia is an example of honest, law abiding and ethical professional
conduct”
0.687
“The opinion of a lawyer’s peers about his professional competence is very important to him” 0.604
“A lawyer should treat all clients equally, regardless of their ﬁnancial status, social standing,
education, etc.”
0.562
Note: Rotation “Varimax”.
Table 7
Description of clusters.
Statements about values Reputation-
oriented
Holders of the
“negative image
of the profession”
Beneﬁt-
oriented
N 145 111 60
Males 55% 59% 51%
ALR members 38% 44% 57%
Statements about values
“If my peer regularly violates professional ethics norms I would prefer not to work with him” 92% 99% 33%
“The profession of a lawyer in Russia is an example of honest, law abiding and ethical professional
conduct”
94% 13% 57%
“The opinion of a lawyer’s peers about his professional competence is very important to him” 83% 64% 32%
“I am prepared to give up my profession if I ﬁnd a job with a higher level of salary but not in the same
specialty”
10% 20% 63%
“An honest lawyer cannot make a career in public law bodies” 22% 47% 18%
“The verdict rather than the establishment of the truth is important in a criminal case” 39% 50% 43%
“Russians who have no legal education often mistrust lawyers” 50% 70% 45%
“A private attorney should ﬁrst and foremost think about his personal income, and only afterwards
about the client’s beneﬁt”
10% 12% 30%
“A lawyer should treat all clients equally, regardless of their ﬁnancial status, social standing,
education, etc.”
99% 70% 63%
During the past 10 years people started feeling less respect for advocates 18% 46% 19%
The registered violations of clients’ rights are often committed by…
Prosecutors 20% 30% 25%
Investigators 47% 57% 36%
Police 58% 65% 48%
Feel a need for a strong professional association performing the following functions
Public screening of draft laws 50% 36% 13%
Enhancement and control of the quality of legal education 52% 36% 13%
Free legal assistance to the population 50% 35% 16%
Holding conferences and congresses, exchange of experience and information within the professional
community
48% 37% 16%
Control of lawyers’ compliance with professional ethics 52% 35% 12%
Note: Pearson Chi Square is signiﬁcant at 0,00. Bold denotes differences that are signiﬁcant at 0,05 level (adjusted standardised residuals >1,96 or <−1,96).
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regard lawyers as examples of honest, law-abiding, and
ethical professionals. At the same time, nearly all
“reputation-oriented” advocates agree with this opinion
(94%), and all of them are convinced (99%) that a lawyer
must treat his clients equally regardless of their ﬁnancial
status. This category of advocates particularly favours the
idea of the creation of a strong professional association.
However, advocates with a cynical view of the profes-
sion also demand collective action much more often than
those who are oriented towards personal beneﬁt. For them,
an association may also be a means of rectifying the current
situation and returning prestige to the profession.
Therefore, the legal profession has a certain nucleus that
shares ethical values and expresses a demand for collec-
tive action and a group of advocates who would potentially
join this association. In this case, both positive orienta-
tions (“development of the community”) and negative
motivations (“rectify the situation”) may become an incen-
tive for development of the professional group and collective
action. Advocates oriented towards personal beneﬁt and
ready to leave the profession for more favourable oppor-
tunities are much less inclined towards collective action.
These advocates may be interested in association member-
ship only from the perspective of obtaining additional status.
Recent years have witnessed a certain dilution of pro-
fessional values among advocates: lawyers have become
increasingly oriented towards personal beneﬁt rather than
professional reputation (see Table 8).
Two-thirds of beneﬁt-oriented advocates and advo-
cates in our survey with a cynical view of the profession
(65% and 64%, respectively) received their higher educa-
tion after the 2000s. Thus, the dilution of professional values
could be the consequence of the marketisation of legal pro-
fession in 1990s (both in terms of education and the labour
market) combined with a weak level of professional control
as described by Abbott (1983). The Legal departments of uni-
versities play a prominent role in this phenomenon (Erlanger
& Klegon, 1978; Mertz, 2007) because they form certain nor-
mative patterns among future professionals. Poor quality
legal faculties in Russia award diplomas of higher educa-
tion but that does not necessarily form professional values
in graduates. At the same time, current professional asso-
ciations (even FCA) are not strong enough to exclude
dishonest lawyers from the profession. Such impunity deﬁ-
nitely reduces the ability of associations to build a
professional reputation. The degradation of professional
values may therefore eventually become a serious obsta-
cle to the development of a professional group.
Questions concerning theviolationsof client rights by rep-
resentatives of various law enforcement bodies (police,
investigators, prosecutors) were included in the question-
naire to test the possible evaluation of the performance of
the entire lawenforcement systembyadvocates. These ques-
tions allow for the identiﬁcation of regions where a
government agency violates client rights more frequently
(Table 9).
Table 9 shows statistically signiﬁcant strong regional vari-
ation in the number of violations of client rights by various
agencies. The worst assessments were given to Moscow, the
Moscow Region, the Far Eastern Federal District, and – re-
garding the police – the Sverdlovsk Region. In our opinion,
the quality of the law enforcement systems in different
regions should be evaluated compared with other regions
and average indicators for the country. The quality of law
enforcement should not be evaluated on the basis of ab-
solute numbers, whichmay be slightly higher than expected
because advocates and law enforcement oﬃcers are often
ex oﬃcio in opposition to one another. We plan to conduct
a survey across all of Russia, which will allow for a better
comparison of the performance of law enforcement agen-
cies and the situation in different regions of Russia on the
basis of advocate assessments.
There are differences in the evaluation of the scope of
violations of client rights inside the profession of advo-
cates (Table 10).
Violations of client rights are most often registered by
bar advocates. Advocates regularly encountering viola-
tions of client rights more frequently cite the reason as a
lack of independent courts (89% compared with 47% who
Table 8
Difference in ethical values of different generations of advocates.
Received legal education in 1970s–
1980s
1990s 2000s–
2010s
Students*
“If my peer regularly violates professional ethics norms I would prefer not to work with him” 92% 91% 80% 62%
“The opinion of a lawyer’s peers about his professional competence is very important to him” 75% 74% 59% 41%
“A private attorney should ﬁrst and foremost think about his personal income, and only afterwards
about the client’s beneﬁt”
12% 11% 18% 22%
Notes: Pearson Chi Square is signiﬁcant at 0,00. Bold denotes differences that are signiﬁcant at 0,05 level (adjusted standardised residuals >1,96 or <−1,96).
*The data about students are taken from the survey (Kazun, 2013).
Table 9
Violation of clients’ rights by law enforcement bodies by region (% of ad-
vocates admitting that violations are frequent).
Region Prosecutors Investigators Police
Volgograd Region 18% 33% 48%
Vologda Region 13% 21% 36%
Far Eastern Federal District 50% 52% 74%
Krasnoyarsk Territory 30% 54% 51%
Moscow 34% 71% 68%
Moscow Region 33% 79% 77%
Penza Region 15% 32% 47%
Sverdlovsk Region 16% 49% 76%
Stavropol Territory 43% 58% 64%
Average estimate for
the 9 regions
28% 50% 60%
Note: Pearson Chi Square is signiﬁcant at 0,00.
68 A. Kazun, A. Yakovlev / Journal of Eurasian Studies 8 (2017) 60–71
rarely encounter these violations). Moreover, one-third be-
lieves that advocates frequently act as intermediaries
between the client and law enforcement to obtain a certain
outcome in the case. Indeed, respondents granting in-
depth interviews referred to these advocates as “deciders”
– ‘reshalshchiki’. The cluster of advocates oriented towards
personal beneﬁt is closest to these “deciders” in terms of
values and also close to the cluster called “pragmatic
brokers” (Liu & Halliday, 2011). This group less frequently
registers violations by investigators and police oﬃcers. Ad-
vocates who often register violations frequently have a
negative image of the profession.
We are particularly interested in the fact that the ad-
vocates who see frequent abuses by law enforcement
agencies are more active in their support of a strong pro-
fessional association (Table 10), which could perform
controlling and representative functions. These advocates
see in this association the possibility of inﬂuencing the au-
thorities to overcome the problems of the law enforcement
system that they encounter in their practice.
The review of the problem of violent pressure on busi-
ness in Russia based on the case of the Centre of Public
Procedures “Business against Corruption” (CPP BAC) shows
that confronting injustice can actually be a catalyst for col-
lective action (Yakovlev, Sobolev, & Kazun, 2014). CPP BAC
already has several examples of the protection of business-
men against unscrupulous representatives of the law
enforcement system. These examples would hardly be pos-
sible without dozens of experts from the legal profession
ready to work on pro bono terms.
However, we cannot assert that this pattern is not a co-
incidence or a derivative of some other cause (e.g., value
orientations) before conducting a system analysis of all the
factors inﬂuencing the demand for collective action. We
therefore proceed to the regression analysis of the data.
7. Regression analysis: hypotheses testing
To test the patterns linking collective action and advo-
cate characteristics, we use ordinal logistic regression. We
constructed our dependent variable based on 5 questions.
These questions concerned whether advocates need a pro-
fessional association to fulﬁl one of the following functions:
screening draft laws, control over the quality of legal edu-
cation, control over professional ethics, holding congresses
and conferences, and representing the interests of the ad-
vocates at the state level. All respondents were categorised
into 6 groups depending on the number of times they an-
swered that this association is “deﬁnitely needed” (from 0
to 5 times).We used the factors based on variables of ethical
values and thequestionof the frequencyof encountering vio-
lationsof client rightsas themainregressors.Weaddedcontrol
variables for education,work experience, specialisation, their
membership in the ALR, and also a dummy variable for the
region and the sphere of previous work (Table 11).
Regression model 1 substantiates our hypothesis that
reputation-oriented advocates (Abbott, 1983) express greater
demand for collective action. Moreover, advocates striv-
ing to maximise their personal beneﬁt are less interested
in the activity of a professional association (the factor of
“beneﬁt maximising” is signiﬁcant with a negative sign). In
addition, a “negative image of the profession” does not
impact advocate support for collective action.
We added to the regression a variable characterising the
frequency of violations of the rights of advocates’ clients by
police, investigators and prosecutors. After adding this vari-
able, factors connected with the value orientations maintain
their signiﬁcance while the explanatory power of the model
increases. This outcome conﬁrms our hypothesis that ex-
periencing violations by law enforcement provides additional
motivation for advocate participation in “collective action.”
8. Conclusion
The ﬁndings indicate a strong qualitative heterogene-
ity in the profession of advocates, with differences in ethical
values and readiness to participate in professional associa-
tions. There is an alarming tendency for negative selection
in the legal profession caused by the dilution of profession-
al boundaries and the growth in the number of “deciders.”
Most advocates note the deteriorating quality of legal ed-
ucation and the overproduction of lawyers with university
degrees. These circumstances led to a decline of ethical
values and the forming of a negative image of the profes-
sion characteristic of legal students and the advocates.
These ﬁndings suggest that the reforms in 2002 had only
a limited positive effect. They have not solved the problem
of the uniﬁcation of all lawyers (including human rights de-
fenders and private lawyers) into a single association with
mandatory membership, as it happened in the USA at the
Table 10
Distinguishing features of advocates frequently encountering violations of clients’ rights.
Variable Seldom
encounter
violations
Sometimes
encounter
violations
Regularly
encounter
violations
Sample as a
whole
Work at a bar association 73% 74% 83% 76%
The reason behind the accusatory tendency is the lack of genuine independence of
courts
47% 80% 89% 75%
Believe that advocates often act as intermediaries between the clients and the justice
system attaining a certain outcome of the case
19% 21% 33% 23%
Agree that “the opinion of a lawyer’s peers about his professional competence is very
important to him”
57% 67% 71% 66%
Believe that advocates deﬁnitely need an association for screening draft laws 38% 47% 64% 49%
Believe that advocates deﬁnitely need an association for controlling ethics compliance 31% 47% 71% 50%
Notes: Pearson Chi Square is signiﬁcant at 0,00. Bold denotes differences that are signiﬁcant at 0,05 level (adjusted standardised residuals >1,96 or <−1,96).
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beginning of the twentieth century (Halliday, Powell, &
Granfors, 1993). Such integration would help to expand the
“healthy core” of the profession and improve the legal pro-
fession’s ability to be a key actor in social change.
Since 2015 FCA and Russian government have actively
discussed the idea of introducing a so-called “monopoly
of advocates”. The idea is to force all lawyers working in
the court to take the exam and enter the FCA. In fact, it
means the union of most Russian lawyers in one
organisation. However, this step has serious risk that
people with low professional qualiﬁcations and low ethical
standards could come into profession, which in turn will
increase the heterogeneity of the professional communi-
ty. Current social and political uncertainty could be a
serious barrier to such integration because it does not
allow professionals to plan their individual and collective
action over a long-term time horizon. Without long-term
planning it is impossible to develop ethical values associ-
ated with a reputation. An orientation on reputation is
not contradictory to an orientation on personal beneﬁts.
The two are compatible if lawyers are sure that other
members of the legal community share the same values
and that customers are guided by professional reputation
as a signal of quality of legal services. While uncertainties
remain, the bona ﬁde core of the legal profession will
remain relatively small.
Despite the risks and limitations, we believe that legal
community can beneﬁt from the consolidation on the basis
of advocacy as this would help to resolve issues related to
the decline in the quality of legal services and frequent vio-
lations of defendant rights by the law enforcers.
We know from the studies of business associations that
the development of standards through professional asso-
ciations relies on the sector’s healthy nucleus. The collective
action of advocates could be intended to create these quality
signals for consumers of legal services. The question is: to
what extent are advocate in Russia ready for this type of
action?
Our survey results demonstrate that advocates in Russia
still have a healthy core that could initiate collective action
to develop and support professional standards and enhance
the social status of advocates. This initiation would come
from advocates oriented towards professional reputations
rather than personal beneﬁt, especially those who regular-
ly encounter violations of client rights by law enforcement
oﬃcers. This result is why one of the possible incentives for
initiating collective action might be the creation of a public
mechanism for the assessment of the law enforcement and
judiciary systems.
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Table 11
Regression models 1 and 2 (ordinal logistic regression).
Number of regression model 1 2
Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig.
Dependent variable: “See a need for a professional association” (from 0 to 5)
Independent variables
The factor of “cynical view of the profession”* 0.13 0.25 0.09 0.43
The factor of “maximising beneﬁt”* −0.25 0.04 −0.25 0.04
The factor of “professional level of control”* 0.34 0.00 0.37 0.00
Rarely encounter violations −1.16 0.00
Sometimes encounter violations −0.50 0.05
Often encounter violations (reference) 0a
Control variables
Distance or evening education −0.42 0.09 −0.39 0.12
Specialisation in business −0.44 0.07 −0.52 0.06
Work beyond the bar 0.18 0.49 0.30 0.26
Sex −0.21 0.38 −0.25 0.29
Age −0.01 0.51 −0.01 0.50
ALR membership −0.01 0.96 −0.01 0.95
Region control yes Yes
Previous work sphere control yes Yes
R square 0.18 0.22
N 298 292
Note: *See description of the factors in Table 7.
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